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WOOD v. H. W. GOSSARD CO.
husband. 2 From the facts of the case, there appeared to
be a clear intent of the father to pass the shares of stock
to his own children and thus exclude his wife and her child,
as he had already provided for her and he wished to leave
his interest in the company to his children. This intent the
father could validly accomplish, without defrauding the
wife of her marital rights (as she claimed was the case)
as long as he effectively carried out his intent by sufficiently
relinquishing dominion and control during his lifetime.'3
The Court of Appeals found that this had been done.
LIABILITY OF MASTER TO GUEST
IN SALESMAN'S AUTOMOBILE
Wood v. H. W. Gossard Co.'
This was a personal injury action brought by a guest
of the defendant's saleswoman arising out of an automobile
collision.
Defendant was a seller of ladies' foundation garments
and had participated in a sales meeting, "Corset Market
Week", in New York. There the saleswoman and defen-
dant's executives made a concentrated effort to have plain-
tiff, a buyer for a Richmond Department store, adopt a new
line of defendant's merchandise, a light-weight model called
"Old Gold". Plaintiff was still uncertain at the end of the
week, but she had stayed over an extra day in New York
to inspect the new line, at the urgings of the saleswoman,
and relinquished airplane accommodations to Baltimore
upon the saleswoman's promise to drive plaintiff to Balti-
more. The saleswoman, as a regional representative, was re-
quired to have a car to cover her territory, for which the
company had loaned her the purchase price. It was part of
the saleswoman's job to attend Corset Market Week in New
IsNew York takes the lead in the newer view in relaxing the requirements
of the older ideas of delivery and acceptance where a clear cut intent can
be found from a contemplation of the facts involved. In re Cohn, 187 App.
Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1919). In a case involving the estate of the
late President Roosevelt, the New York Court went to great lengths in
carrying out his wishes regarding the distribution of his papers, even
though only partial delivery had been made. In re Roosevelt's Will, 190
Misc. Rep. 341, 73 N. Y. Supp. 2d 821 (1947).
I Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 550, 87 A. 2d, 608 (1952). See also
Note, 157 A. L. R. 1184, 1189; Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of
the Rights of Surviving Spouses, loo. cit., supra, n. 9; Katzenstein, Joint
Savings Bank Accounts in Maryland, 3 Md. L. Rev. 109, 110-114 (1939).
1204 Md. 177, 103 A. 2d 130 (1954).
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York, and the following week to be at a sales meeting in
Chicago. The trip to Baltimore from New York, on which
plaintiff was injured was the first leg of the saleswoman's
drive from New York to Chicago. On the day before the
return trip the saleswoman, in company with plaintiff, told
the Eastern sales manager that plaintiff was staying over
and that she was driving the plaintiff part of the way
home. He wished them a good trip and said he wished he
was going with them. Other executives of defendant were
conversant with the arrangement, and with the sales-
woman's efforts to make plaintiff a customer for the "Old
Gold" line. Moreover, the defendant company was de-
scribed as one big family in which everyone knew what
the other was doing and in which each helped the other.
Suit was filed against both the saleswoman and the com-
pany and verdict was rendered against both. The trial
court however, entered a judgment n. o. v. in favor of the
Company from which plaintiff appeals.
In reversing the Court of Appeals found: "that unques-
tionably there was evidence from which the jury could rea-
sonably find that Miss Brown (the saleswoman) was an
employee", "that the trip in which Mrs. Wood was injured
was in furtherance of her employer's business", and that
"the ultimate question, onwhich the decision hinges, is...
did she have express or apparent authority to permit Mrs.
Wood (the plaintiff) to ride in the automobile on the oc-
casion in question?".2
The court, paraphrasing the Restatement of Agency, Sec.
242, comment a., lays down as a general principle that:
".... if a third person enters a vehicle operated by a
servant and does so at the invitation of or with the
permission of the servant who has no authority or ap-
parent authority to give such invitation or permission,
the master is not liable..."3
But the court also clearly recognized that merely pro-
viding a servant with a car to operate in the master's busi-
ness does not establish the ostensible authority to invite
riders, saying:
"However, a servant operating a motor vehicle is
not regarded, by that fact alone, as thereby clothed
with even the appearance of authority to invite third
persons to ride."4
2 Ibid, 182-3.8 Ibidl, 181-2.
•Ibid, 182.
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Now apparent authority is, generally, that doctrine
which binds the principal by an unauthorized act of his
agent where the principal has, by his direct act or negligent
omission or acquiescence, caused or permitted the person
dealing with the agent reasonably to believe that the prin-
cipal has actually conferred the particular authority, and
upon which that person has relied.' It is only in rare cases
that it has application in the master and servant relation-
ship, as it is primarily applied to the principal-agent rela-
tionship, as pointed out in East Coast Frcight Lines v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore."
In that case an issue was submitted to the jury as to
whether the driver had apparent authority to invite plain-
tiff's decedent to ride on defendant's tractor-trailer." This
was held to be error and the court said the issue should
have been whether the driver had expressed or implied
authority.8 It was stated, "As pointed out in the case of
Great A. & P. Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 A. 434,
the doctrine of apparent authority is applicable only where
the relation of employer and employee is that of principal
agent."9 And further, in speaking of the difference between
an agent and a servant, this reason is given:
"The distinction is of importance here where the
inquiry is directed to the liability of the master for the
tortious acts of a servant. In the case of an agent that
liability often depends upon the apparent authority of
the agent because, since it is his function to create
primary obligations giving rise to primary rights, the
person with whom he deals representing his principal
may justly complain if he is permitted by the principal
to display an appearance of authority which has never
in fact been granted him. In the case of a servant whose
acts do not create, but violate, primary rights, and give
rise to secondary obligations and remedial rights, ap-
pearances are of less importance because usually the
third party is not misled by the master's representa-
tions of the servant's authority."10
However, Professor Mechem believed that apparent au-
thority may sometimes be applicable to a master-servant
relation. He says:
5 MCHEM, LAW OF AGENCOY (2d ed., 1914), Sec. 729.
' 190 Md. 256, 58 A. 2d 290, 2 A. L. R. 2d 386 (1948).
Ibid, 283.
Ibtd, 285.
'Ibid, 284.lIbid, 284-5.
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"The doctrine of apparent powers, which, as has
been seen, plays so important a part in determining
an agent's authority in contractual cases, is much less
important in this field (liability to third persons).
Third persons may readily be induced by appearances
of authority to enter into business dealings with an
agent, but the cases must be much fewer in which a
person is induced by any appearance of authority in
a servant to become the victim of the servant's negli-
gence or misconduct. There may be such cases, how-
ever, as for example where persons are led by the ap-
pearance of authority to obey directions, follow instruc-
tions, omit precautions, and the like, and as a conse-
quence are subjected to danger and suffer injury."'"
Language acknowledging the application of the prin-
ciple to a master-servant situation can be found in the dicta
of several American cases. 2 Typical of these is Shrimplin
v. Simmons Auto Co., Inc.'s where it is said:
"The owner of a motor vehicle operated by a servant
is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one in-
vited therein by the servant ... when the servant is
without actual, ostensible or implied authority to ex-
tend the invitation..., 14
Two cases arising out of situations similar to the prin-
cipal case have turned on the application of apparent
authority.
In Cole v. Johnson Motor Co."5 an automobile salesman
picked up some hitch-hiking Duke girls in a demonstration
car. The appellate court set aside a directed verdict for
defendant company, saying:
"These considerations (private instructions to serv-
ant) however, do not foreclose recovery in cases where
the invitation may be considered within the ostensible
scope of authority, where the deviation from actual
n Op. cit., supra, n. 5, Sec. 1885; Cf. MECrEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY (4th ed., 1952, by Philip Mechem), Chs. XII, XIII.
12Dyer v. McCorkle, 208 Cal. 216, 280 P. 965, 967 (1929); Barall Food
Stores v. Bennett, 194 Okla. 508, 153 P. 2d 106, 108 (1944) ; Monnet v.
Ulman, 129 Or. 44, 276 P. 244, 245 (1929) ; Glacomuzzi v. Klein, 324 Mass.
689, 88 N. E. 2d 548, 550 (1949) ; Dearborn v. Fuller, 79 N. H. 217, 107 A.
607, 608 (1919).
8122 W. Va. 248, 9 S. E. 2d 49 (1940).
Ibid, 52.
-217 N. C. 756, 9 S. E. 2d- 425 (1940).
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authority may be slight or where the invitation and
transportation may have some reasonable relation to
the furtherance of the employer's business."'"
Less extreme is the case of De Parcq v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. 17 where a directed verdict was also set aside.
There was evidence in the case that the salesman had given
rides, some of considerable length, to people in the past,
and that the practice was known to the district manager.
It was said:
"We also think that these same rides... constituted
evidence of a holding out by Rosenquist (master) that
Thompson (servant) had authority to give such rides;
and that such holding out clothed Thompson with ap-
parent authority to take people relying thereon on such
rides; and that there was substantial evidence tending
to show that plaintiff knew of such holding out and
relied upon the same, at the time of taking the trip here
in controversy; and that it was therefore for the jury
to say whether Thompson had apparent authority to
take plaintiff on the trip."'18
Although there is some out of state authority for apply-
ing apparent authority to the master-servant relation, it is
submitted that the doctrine need not have been applied in
the instant case. If actual authority is "the power of the
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts
done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of
consent to him","9 it would seem that the acquiescence of
the master's executives, taken in the light of the concerted
effort of all concerned to sell the plaintiff, and knowing
that the drive would afford added opportunity to make the
sale, is such a manifestation of consent. In fact the Court
itself seems to lose sight of its previous apparent authority
discussion by concluding with language equally applicable
to actual authority, in this way:
... and reasonable men could find, that the ar-
rangements for the ride had the full blessings of the
company and that she (plaintiff) was its guest as well
as (the servant's) .,2O
- Ibid, 427.
17 81 F. 2d 777 (Sth Cir., 1936).
Ibid, 780-1.
1 RE.STATEMENT, AGENCY (1933), Sec. 7.
204 Md. 177, 186, 103 A. 2d 130 (1954).
19541
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Moreover, placing the decision on apparent authority
grounds leaves the reasoning open to criticism as to whether
a guest really accepts the invitation because of reliance on
the master's assent to the holding out. One editor says:
"In point of fact it would seem that ordinarily one
who gets the servant's permission to ride is quite satis-
fied therewith; and in most cases it would be remark-
able to picture such a person as acting on the permis-
sion or invitation only because he understands that it
comes from the master. '2 1
Whether the decision is categorized as based on apparent
or actual authority, it is submitted that it is sound. For
the rule protecting a master from liability for injury to un-
authorized invitees of the servant is an effort to keep within
reasonable bounds the very broad risks incident to the
master's sending his servant out on business with an auto-
mobile. Yet, where the master has actual knowledge of
the invitation in advance, no risk in addition to those con-
templated is incurred, and the general rule should apply.
REMARRIAGE AFTER DECREE IMPOSING
WAITING PERIOD'
Henderson v. Henderson2
Plaintiff-appellee-wife filed a bill in equity to obtain a
divorce a mensa et thoro from defendant-appellant-husband
alleging that the defendant, who, as she claimed, married
her in Iowa in 1943, had committed cruelty and construc-
tive desertion. In a cross-bill for an annulment of their
marriage, defendant alleged that the Iowa marriage was
invalid inasmuch as plaintiff was then'still under the dis-
ability of an effective prohibition against remarriage in a
"Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 406, 422. See also dissent in De Parcq v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 8upra, n. 17, dis. op. 781.
1For leading articles on the subject of marriage in Maryland, see
Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriage8 in Maryland and Their Annulment,
2 Md. L. Rev. 211 (1938), and Strahorn, Fifteen Yeara of Change in Mary-
land Marriage and Annulment Law and Dome8tic Relation8 Procedure8, 13
Md. L. Rev. 128 (1953).
2 199 Md. 449, 87 A. 2d 403 (1951). This case Is cited In Milton v. Escue,
201 Md. 190, 202, 93 A. 2d 258 (1952), as authority for the proposition that
the Court of Appeals will recognize the validity of a common-law marriage
arising in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such marriages;
noted, 13 Md. L. Rev. 261 (1953), on this point.
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